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I. EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The advent of autonomous driving (AD) makes automotive
industry embrace high-performance hardware such as acceler-
ators to execute performance-hungry tasks (e.g. object recog-
nition and tracking) timely. However, while those accelerators
have been widely deployed in the consumer electronics market,
where performance within given power and thermal envelopes
is the main concern, critical real-time systems, such as those
in AD, pose a set of different challenges related to functional
safety. In particular, safety-related automotive systems (e.g.
braking, steering, etc), which include most AD functionalities,
need to meet specific requirements described in the ISO26262
functional safety standard [1] to be deployed in cars. Those
requirements, which mostly relate to the ability of the sys-
tem to detect faults and prevent hazardous situations, impose
strict verification and validation (V&V) requirements on the
system and its components thereof. Hence, high-performance
accelerators deployed in cars for AD must adhere to those
requirements, which needs to be conveniently proven.
In the context of ISO26262, functionalities are classified
in different Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) based
on the type of hazard they can cause, their severity, their
exposure and the controllability upon a failure. In particular,
safety-related functionalities are ranked from ASIL-D (the
highest integrity level) to ASIL-A (the lowest), being ASIL-D
components involved in ASIL-D functionalities those subject
to the strictest V&V processes.
GPUs are becoming the most popular accelerator for AD,
and they are already included in specific AD commercial
platforms, such as RENESAS R-Car H3 [2] and NVIDIA
Xavier [3] platforms. Those platforms include general purpose
microcontrollers (e.g. ARM or Infineon cores) proven ASIL-
D capable, as well as high-performance accelerators whose
adherence to ASIL-D must also be proven so that they can
perform AD-related activities. In particular, as detailed in
ISO26262, ASIL-D systems must not allow a single fault
lead the system to a hazardous situation. Appropriate safety
measures include some form of independent redundancy, thus
ensuring that a single fault will not lead redundant elements
to identical erroneous outputs. For instance, Error Detection
and/or Correction Codes are often used for storage and com-
munication interfaces, whereas Dual Core LockStep (DCLS)
with some source of diversity (e.g. staggered execution) is
used for computation elements so that a single fault affecting
all redundant components (e.g. a voltage droop) does not
cause them to fail identically (see example on Figure 1). In
the case of GPUs, they have already been proven ASIL-B
compliant, but, to our knowledge, ASIL-D compliance has
only been achieved by implementing expensive independent
redundancy means. In particular, either full system replication
or heterogeneous implementations are used. The former, for
instance, performs object recognition based on cameras and LI-
DAR, with different software implementations and, potentially,
different hardware support. The latter, for instance, performs
object recognition based only on cameras, but software is
implemented and deployed for different accelerators (e.g. a
GPU and a Deep Neural Network – DNN – accelerator) [4].
In both cases, design and V&V costs are duplicated, which
is against efficiency and costs. For instance, these approaches
clash with that followed for ASIL-D microcontrollers, which
build upon diverse DCLS. Hence, it is critically important
enabling some form of diverse DCLS on GPUs so that ASIL-
D compliance can be achieved without needing to design
and certify multiple heterogeneous software and hardware
components.
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Fig. 1. Example of a Dual Core LockStep with Staggering Execution
This study tackles this challenge by identifying the main re-
quirements to enable ASIL-D compliance for Commercial Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) GPUs, assessing to what extent they have
the potential to meet ASIL-D requirements, and providing a set
of lowly-intrusive modifications that allow adhering to ASIL-D
requirements without diminishing their performance for non-
safety-related functionalities. Those modifications allow GPU
vendors to reuse their designs avoiding a significant increase
of their Non-Recurring Expenses (NRE). In particular, we
perform our analysis on an NVIDIA COTS GPU, implement
modifications on a GPU simulator where we can assess both
performance and ASIL-D compliance, and evaluate what the
performance impact would be on the COTS GPU.
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